For an Empirical Reading of Physics by Tesoro, Juan
For an empirical reading of
physics
by Juan Tesoro Oliver (1936-2009)
revision 3 of May 2010

Abstract
This essay invites the reader to interpret physics from a radically empiri-
cal standpoint, both diachronic and relative. We start with some criteria
of the theory of knowledge, the basis for interpreting the fundamentals of
mathematics and physics.
Then we present some expositions of physics, including a new character-
ization of time, space and movement, with reference to classical mechanics,
relativity and quantum mechanics.
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“We have found a strange footprint on the shores of the un-
known. We have devised profound theories, one after another,
to account for its origins. At last, we have succeeded in recon-
structing the creature that made the footprint. And Lo! it is our
own.”(Eddington)
Physics does not often make any reference to the principles of the theory
of knowledge that are the foundation of its expositions: it takes for granted
that they are unquestionable and universally accepted. But in fact, physics
has maintained and still maintains different criteria about the nature of re-
ality and about our knowledge of it. Therefore it is convenient to present in
advance some underlying considerations which sustain our proposed empiri-
cal reading of physics.
We consider that empirical reality is made up of all the observable things
or references, and that they are distributed between two different scenarios.
In the exterior scenario are the things that are jointly visible to all people
such us objects, events and the relationships between them. In the interior
scenario, that we call the mind, are the things than can only be observed
individually, each person perceiving his/her own - such us his/her memories,
thoughts and sentiments. There are as many interior scenarios, all of them
private, as there are human beings, but there is only one universal and public
exterior scenario and we will call this our world, this world, or simply the
world.
Here we refer exclusively to the exterior empirical reality, giving two dif-
ferent meanings to the term observations : the first is that of actions that
allow us to obtain empirical information about reality, and the second is the
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actual information we obtain from these actions. With this second meaning
we understand that observations are collections of sensations integrated in
accordance with experience and interpreted according to knowledge already
elaborated and to socially shared held convictions.
We will use the term ways of being of things to refer to their empirical
characteristics: these characteristics arouse physiochemical reactions of our
senses, which act on the brain through the sensory nerves originating in it the
physiological phenomena linked to the reactions. The sensations that produce
in each observer the way of being of things are the mental manifestations that
accompany these cerebral phenomena, to the extent that if the phenomena
were produced by artificial means the same sensations would be aroused in
the mind of the observer.
It results from the above that the ways of being of things provoke in us
two simultaneous and interdependent empirical manifestations, each one lo-
cated in a different scenario. In the brain they provoke external physiological
phenomena that can be observed by everyone, and in the mind they provoke
sensations that can be perceived only internally, each individual perceiving
his/her own sensations.
The physiological phenomena linked to the sensations leave lasting bio-
logical marks in the brain, and it is by these marks that the phenomena can
be reproduced, wholly or partially, with varying degrees of precision. The
sensations linked to the reproduced phenomena are the memories of the ways
of being we had observed. By combining memories we can conceive things
that had never been observed, such as flying horses or talking trees, but we
cannot naturally conceive ways of being that we had never observed, since
we have no memory of them.
Observations are always accompanied by interpretations that give them
meaning. As Kant remarked on the subject of concepts and perceptions, we
may regard observations without interpretations as inarticulate, and inter-
pretations without observations as empty.
Interpretations of reality are arranged in systems of propositions classi-
fied as myths and theories; myths mainly contain convictions without any
empirical evidence, whereas theories start from observable references. The
collection of myths and theories shared by a society forms its system of ideas
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and beliefs, what we will call the cultural awareness of such society.
It is important to note that the cultural awareness of a society contains
convictions considered indisputable and which are deeply rooted and widely
spread. In many cases these convictions are articles of faith as regards reality,
and are never questioned.
We are going to establish that, in general, any theory concerning reality
and empirical knowledge has to be compatible with three basic considera-
tions:
1. The real things of our world can be perceived by any normal observer
in the right circumstances for this perception;
2. All observations are interpreted within the framework of the cultural
awareness in force, which changes with the passing of time and with
the increase of experience;
3. The effective extensions of empirical knowledge test the validity of the
interpretations that are included in the already elaborated theories.
With these considerations we propose a radically empirical interpretation
of physical reality, which rests in a main postulate: although the ways of
being of things are not dependent on our will, they do depend on the sen-
sations they arouse in us, given that we characterize them or ‘dress’ them
with these sensations. And we understand at the same time that the logical
structures adopted by empirical theories are always relative because they de-
pend on the development of reason and on the usefulness of the established
empirical knowledge.
In consequence, our sensations are the raw material we use to characterize
empirical reality. The ways of being associated to it would not exist in the
absence of one or other of our senses. For example: without the sense of
sight empirical reality would not have visible ways of being. It would have
no sonorous ways of being without hearing, nor hard or soft or cold or hot
ways of being without touch; there would no be tastes or smells without the
appropriate senses.
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Since visual observations, very rapid and much more comprehensive than
the rest, predominate in this sphere, we will refer to them from now on,
unless the contrary is stated.
The senses are not the only channel for the empirical characterization of
reality, all the other human characteristics come into play. The size of our
body determines the structure and the spatial discernment we make of large
objects; if our body were gigantic, earth-like, or microscopically small, then
our characterization of spatial structures would be very different in these
extreme cases.
In a similar way, the rhythm of the biological processes of our body defines
the speed with which we observe things and record memories of them, and
this determines our discrimination in characterizing the temporal sequence
of events. If we could either observe or remind millions of things per second
or, on the contrary, our mind were extremely slow in either observing or pro-
cessing memories, in each of these extreme cases our ability to discriminate
events by their successive parts would be very different.
As to the objectivity of the ways of being of things, we understand this
must be taken as relative since it is always referred, implicitly or explicitly,
to a certain group of observers.
Therefore we consider there is no single empirical characterization of re-
ality; different characterizations may coexist due to different observers, all
of them equally real. Our world is single but its empirical identity is not as
it may be characterized simultaneously as visible or invisible (by observers
gifted with sight or by the blind), sonorous or silent (by those with or without
the sense of hearing), and so on.
When we suppose that the world would exist even without human beings,
this might mean either that the world could continue even though humans
became extinct or that the world would have existed without the presence of
human beings. The first of these suppositions might come about one day, but
the second is a contradiction in terms since all the things and all the events
of all the worlds imaginable are characterized by our sensations. There is
no empirical sense in imagining a world existing without us, it is we who
imagine it and characterize it.
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In short, the radical empirical reading of physics that we propose is based
on three basic considerations:
1. All the things of our world are in it, but not existent of themselves.
When we observe things we don’t simply see them but we characterize
their ways of being.
2. The ways of being of things are always relative to our natural attributes
and to the content of our cultural awareness.
3. Our world and our cultural awareness are endlessly and interdepen-
dently subject to change.
In particular, if we project our past into the future, we can imagine an
unlimited succession of human generations that will continue to develop their
empirical knowledge and their cultural awareness, interactively entwined.
The human beings of the future will change accordingly, and will become as
strange to us as we would be to our prehistoric ancestors if they could see
us.
Note that the realistic empirical interpretation of our world, strongly
rooted in our cultural awareness, is based on a shared universal conviction
that is regarded as unquestionable: the way of being of things and the rela-
tionships between them have an objective empirical identity that is indepen-
dent of their observation. Let us agree on calling the set of theories based on
this belief primary realism.
Another four main convictions of this primary realism can be remarked:
1. Empirical knowledge is worked out by a generic subject, the human
being, who discovers reality through the appropriate natural faculties,
among which are the senses, the reason and the memory.
2. The task of the observer is basically passive and receptive as it consists
in reflecting reality –and the objective order that governs it– in his/her
mind.
3. Equal ways of being provoke equal sensations in different observers,
although these may integrate them and react to them in different ways.
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4. The number of ways of being of things is limited. The observation and
definitive interpretation of all of them and of their relationships is the
aim of empirical knowledge in which it will reach its final completeness.
From our point of view, these four realistic convictions are not consistent.
We consider that the subject of knowledge is not the generic human being in
general but the variable cultural awareness of each society. It also seems to
us incorrect to view our task of observers of empirical reality as a mere reflec-
tion; we regard it as creative also because we assign to the things identities
deriving from our observations and interpretations. And then the idea that
identical ways of being provoke identical sensations in different observers has
no empirical justification, given that no observer has access to the sensations
of others for purposes of comparison.
In addition, since our knowledge of the world grows indefinitely, revealing
to observation new fields of reality whose interpretation test the already built
theories, it seems unlikely that empirical knowledge is moving towards a final
goal. It is more consistent to consider that there is no goal in this sense, but
rather a course to be run under the direction of developed knowledge and in
the circumstances and with the intentions of the society the develops it.
According to other theories, true reality, or at least the ultimate reality
of things, always lies hidden from empirical observation. These speculative
theories have no empirical signification because what cannot be observed
cannot be proved.
“What we see of things are the things. Why should we see
one thing if there were another? Why should seeing and hearing
be deceptive if seeing and hearing are seeing and hearing?”
(Pessoa)
We are convinced that sight, for example, tells us the colours that things
have, but the truth is that in the absence of the sense of sight colours would
not exist. It may seem absurd to deny the independent existence of the
visible ways of being of things, that are ‘there outside’ for anyone who looks
at them. But we should acknowledge that all visible forms are the result of
our seeing them. In the phrase of Berkeley, “nothing is visible except what
we perceive by sight”.
Comment on reason and
experience
“The light dove cleaving in free flight the thin air, whose re-
sistance it feels, might imagine that her movements would be far
more free and rapid in airless space. Just in the same way did
Plato, abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow lim-
its it sets to the understanding, venture upon the wings of ideas
beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect.” (Kant)
Kant intended to place the mechanics of Newton on a new philosophical
foundation. He began by analyzing the significant judgements of the kind
subject-predicate whose expressions are known as propositions. As regards
their content, these judgements are called analytical when their meaning
is derived from the predicates that define the subject and synthetic when
they add predicates to the subject that are not contained in its definition.
With regard to their validation, this can be a priori or a posteriori to the
experience.
The idealistic and the empirical philosophers before Kant had considered
all the analytical judgements as a priori and all the a posteriori judgements
as synthetic, but they had disagreed as to whether there could be synthetic
judgements that were a priori, or in other words, whether empirical knowl-
edge could be obtained by reasoning, without the need to confirm it by
experience. They had disagreed particularly about the bases for the validity
of the principles of mathematics and physics.
In the idealism of Leibniz, the principles of mathematics and of physics
are those of reason, which can be validated a priori. In the empiricism of
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Hume, however, this was meaningless, even though he found no empirical
foundation of their validity.
Kant rejected both the rationalistic idealism of Leibniz, which he found
lacking in empirical content and therefore ineffective to grant validity to
scientific principles, and also the sceptical empiricism of Hume which he
found incapable of granting this validity. To overcome this double incapacity,
Kant considered that empirical knowledge starts with experience, but that
not all of it comes from experience. In particular, Kant characterized space
and time as a priori forms of our external and internal sensitivity, and this
led him to consider that the principles of mathematics and of physics contain
a priori components which give them the necessary validity, which allows to
consider them as synthetic a priori judgements.
Kant’s exposition was subjected to later debate and finally surpassed in
the XIX century, largely as a consequence of the critical thrust that Kant
himself had given to the theory of learning. Bertrand Russell remarked this
in his personal style: “Kant’s sincerity drove him to fulfil more completely
than did many other philosophers the obligation to demonstrate his own
failure”.
There is still controversy over whether there are synthetic a priori judge-
ments. The possibility is accepted by the Neo-Kantian philosophers but
rejected by positivists and empiricists. We are going to maintain a radically
empirical criterion, stating that there is no synthetic a priori judgement
nor any empirical reference that would endorse such a conjecture. We un-
derstand, therefore, that synthetic propositions can be validated only by
experience. We wish to underline that the existence of something cannot
be substantiated by reasoning but only by observation, which means that
existence cannot be demonstrated but only confirmed.
It is important to differentiate the adjectives that define the validity of
propositions, giving –as a convention– a single exclusive meaning to each
one. So we consider that according to the validity conferred by reasoning,
it is only analytical propositions that can be true or absurd (or contradic-
tory). And according to the validity conferred by experience, it is only the
synthetic propositions that can be certain or false. If a proposition admits a
double reading, analytical and synthetic, then its validity requires a double
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verification, and it could be absurd and false, absurd and certain, true and
false, or true and certain.
This conventional distinction between meanings makes more complicated
the normal use of language in which rational is mixed with empirical, that
is to say: true with certain, and absurd with false. With the distinction we
establish, truth is purely a matter of reason and certainty is exclusively a
matter of experience.
When the validity of a proposition is confirmed by the logical or by the
empirical references of the case in point, we say that it is consistent. The
consistency of the propositions is relative because it is related to logical
systems or to empirical theories into which they are integrated. We will
say that analytical propositions rationally consistent are coherent – or that
they are cohesive – and that synthetic propositions empirically consistent are
consequent.
We consider that propositional logic is exclusively an abstract science
that develops the varieties of redundances. In the words of Planck, “In its
purest form, mathematics, only coordinates and gives coherent relationship
of one certainty to another”. We must recognize, however, that our cultural
awareness still has blind faith in the capacity of reason to provide a priori
knowledge of the world, knowledge that is necessarily certain. This belief has




“When mathematical propositions are related to reality, they
are not true; when they are true, they make no reference to real-
ity.” (Einstein)
Mathematics can be read in two different ways: one logical and abstract
in which all the propositions are analytical and are validated a priori, and the
other empirical and concrete in which all the propositions are synthetic and
are validated a posteriori. The same mathematical proposition can be read
as analytical and as synthetic, in accordance with the meaning – abstract or
concrete – assigned to its terms.
Taking account of the exclusive meanings we have assigned conventionally
to truth and certainty, the above quotation from Einstein may be expressed
as follows : When concrete meanings are assigned to the terms of the true
analytical propositions of pure mathematics, we turn them into synthetic
propositions whose certainty is not guaranteed by the truth of the former
terms; when analytical propositions of abstract mathematics are said to be
true, this statement is not referring at all to reality .
The conviction that the truth of pure mathematics is a necessary guaran-
tee of the certainty of applied mathematics must be rejected outright. The
analytical proposition of pure mathematics ‘seven plus five equals twelve’ is
true because it says nothing that is not contained in the abstract definition
of its terms (‘seven’, ‘five’, ‘twelve’, ‘equality’). However, the corresponding
proposition of applied mathematics ‘seven things plus five things are equal
to twelve things’ is synthetic and it has to be validated by experience.
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With the background of our cultural awareness it is difficult to accept
that the sum of five things and seven things may differ from twelve things,
since twelve was the result of all our observations. But no empirical reference
affirms that this has to be the same in the future, nor in any other possible
reality. We cannot reject empirically the existence of another reality – or
that this may come to exist –, a reality that would involve the disappearance
of some of the things added together or the appearance of new ones, making
the sum of five things and seven things different from twelve things.
Starting from a few axioms that seemed to be unquestionably certain a
priori, Euclid developed geometry as an empirical deductive science, which
made it appear both true and certain. With this double validation, geometry
was long considered an uncontested example of an a priori synthetic science.
But in the XIX century it was shown that the so-called ‘postulate of
parallels’ (‘in the plane, given any straight line and a point not on it, there
exists one and only one straight line which passes through that point and
is parallel to the first line’) could not be deduced from the other Euclidean
postulates. In a vain attempt to reduce to the absurd any other number of
parallels, two new geometries were drawn up, as coherent as that of Euclid:
one the so-called elliptical – or of Riemann – according to which no parallel
can be drawn, and the other known as hyperbolic – or of Lobachevsky or
Bolyai – which postulated that more than one and even an infinite number
of parallels can be drawn.
To confirm which of these three true analytical geometries is certain, one
must first transform them into synthetic geometries, assigning precise empir-
ical meanings to their terms. The result of this is that the certainty of any
one of them becomes relative since each could be certain respect the different
empirical meanings allotted to it. If the terms of the three geometries are
given the traditional empirical meanings and the normal spatial fields of our
observations are taken into account, then the Euclidean geometry is found
to be the only one that is perceptibly certain.
The sum of the three angles of a triangle is a relevant example of the
discrepancy between the three geometries: in the Euclidean, the sum is equal
to two right angles, whereas in that of Riemann it is more and in that of
Lobachevsky it is less. Gauss is said to have measured (in secret, so as not to
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scandalize the physicists of his time) the three angles of a nocturnal triangle
of light signals. He found that the sum of the angles formed by the visual
signals differed from two right angles by less than the foreseeable error in the
measurement of the sum. This meant that the empirical space is perceptibly
Euclidean in relation to the means of observation available to Gauss and for
distances similar to those of the three visual signals.
The development of the two new geometries different from the Euclidean
led mathematicians of the second half of the XIX century to enlarge the
logical field of geometry, extending its abstract components and generalizing
its definitions, axioms and postulates. These analytical geometries, without
figures or other visual references, define abstract spaces and must be seen as
special branches of logic.
Arithmetic was also considered an a priori synthetic science. Followers
of Pythagoras even considered numbers to be the true reality of things and
Kant was still convinced that arithmetical statements were a priori synthetic.
Nowadays two aspects are considered in arithmetic –as in geometry – inter-
related but of a different kind: while pure arithmetic is made up of abstract
definitions and postulates, in applied arithmetic these are empirical. A close
formal relationship exists between these two aspects, but not between their
validations.
Hilbert took the abstract characterization of mathematics to extremes in
considering that by means of mathematical definitions and axioms, abstract
deductive systems can be set up in which all mathematical propositions are
meaningful and can be validated in a single way (which in terms of logic
means that deductive mathematical systems are complete and consistent).
This view was widely accepted, and in fact is still accepted, by mathemati-
cians even though it was soon shown by Go¨del to be untrue.
Empirical mathematics retains the deductive arrangement of pure math-
ematics and this arrangement facilitates practical applications and guides
their development; so that pure mathematics is therefore an indispensable
tool for the formal structuring of empirical science.
“How can it be that mathematics, being after all a product
of human thought which is independent of experience, is so ad-
mirably appropriate to the objects of reality?.” (Einstein)
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This question has been answered in various ways. From the formalist
standpoint, that of the majority, pure mathematics is a series of empty logical
structures in which experience finds an ordered arrangement. For us, all logic
in general and mathematics in particular proceed from experience, so it is
normal they accord so well with it. Galileo considered that “the book of
nature is written in the language of mathematics”; we think that this should
be turned round to say that the book of mathematics is written in the
language of nature.
“I do not think that technical conquests are simply secondary
precipitates of natural science; they are its logical proofs. If we
had not set out to achieve these conquests, we would not have
known how to reason. The only correct reasoning is that which
has practical results.” (Boltzmann)
“Some thinkers state that the principles of logic are basically
ontological principles since if they were not somehow founded in
reality they would not prevail.” (Ferrater Mora)
Mathematics and physical
knowledge
We will use the term physical reality to name the empirical reality dealt with
by physics. Physical reality is made up of all the things of our world, but is
not made up of all the ways of being of the things of our world; physics deals
with a selection of ways of being which it defines and interprets in a specific
manner.
Physical theories are formally structured into deductive systems that start
from principles or axioms to which the character of natural laws is usually
attributed. So physics is an empirical science because of its content and a
rational science on account of its form, and therefore the valid propositions
of physics have to be both certain and true.
We will assign qualitative definitions to physical entities by means of
empirical references that allow them to be observed directly. The qualitative
definition of a particular physical characteristic can be extended to a general
collection of characteristics, taking all of them as qualitatively equal or as
being of the same physical nature. In comparing physical characteristics of
the same nature it may be that no empirical difference is found between
them, as for example in comparing the straightness of segments. But in
most cases empirical differences can and may be observed between them,
which allow an apportionment of relative physical values, as occurs with the
lengths of segments. We will term physical amounts the characteristics that
can be valued relatively, and physical magnitudes the sets of qualitatively
equal amounts.
To form a quantitative definition of physical amounts is to specify a pro-
cedure for establishing the relative values among them. The qualitative defi-
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nition together with the quantitative one of a physical amount jointly form its
empirical definition. To measure amounts consists in determining their rela-
tive values and to measure magnitudes consists in measuring their amounts.
Some physicists consider that to make a qualitative definition of physi-
cal magnitudes is unnecessary – that it is enough to know how to measure
them. They think that the lack of a qualitative definition of magnitudes is
not a barrier to operating with them or to develop the physical expositions in
which they are included, thus establishing that qualitative knowledge of the
magnitudes comes implicitly from the practise of operating with them. As a
consequence, throughout the development of physics some magnitudes that
are difficult to identify qualitatively, but easy to measure (such as time and
space), remain empirically undefined. These magnitudes are normally con-
sidered to be ‘primary physical notions, undefinable, intuitive and universally
well known’.
“I do not define time, space nor place because these words are
universally well known.” (Newton)
“Time is one of the things we may not be able to define, but
merely say that it is what we know it is.” (Feynman)
We think it paradoxical not to be able to define something that is univer-
sally well known. In any case we understand that to operate with magnitudes
that have not been identified empirically is a limitation and a clouding over
of the meaning of the operations. In this we follow physicists who take an
opposite view:
“Nothing that cannot be recognized, nothing that cannot be
characterized by the senses, has any significance in science.”
(Mach)
“A concept does not exist for a physicist until the possibility
arises to ascertain in a given case whether it is certain or not.”
(Einstein)
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There are substantive differences between mathematics and physics that
should be stressed. Infinite numbers, accurate results and perfect figures re-
ceive rigorous rational treatment in abstract mathematics, whereas in physics
there are only finite quantities, approximate results and imperfect figures.
Some terms, such as ‘all’ or ‘always’ which have meanings of extremes, have
no rigorous physical meaning although they do have it in the expositions of
abstract mathematics. We will use these terms with approximate meanings,
sufficient for each case we consider, but emphasizing that the rigorous accu-
racy of mathematical expositions gives rational support to the approximate
accuracy of physical expositions; therefore these have no need of a logic of
their own to give them coherence.
“From the point of view of physics, in which it is not possible
to find physical means of differentiation, there can be no empirical
objection to the simplest of mathematical suppositions, that of
continuity.” (B. Russell).
It may occur that a proposition admits a rational meaning and an em-
pirical one, and that the two have contrary validations. An example is the
Euclidean postulate : “the whole is greater than one of its parts”, a state-
ment that is still physically certain but no longer mathematically true since
Cantor distinguished the different classes of countable infinities.
The abstract division of quantities into a number of parts is an operation
that is always possible, no matter how many parts. But the division of
amounts into smaller and smaller parts always reaches a bottom limit below
which it is not feasible. Before the division becomes impracticable, parts are
often obtained that are so small that it would have no physical meaning to
continue the division. These parts, which have the same physical meaning
as their own parts, form the elemental amounts of the magnitudes.
The elemental amounts are relative since they depend on the physical
expositions in question. Special mention should be made of the size of the
points and the duration of the instants. The size of the earth is insignificant
in relation to the scale of the solar system but it is enormous if one consid-
ers what is contained on its surface. In a similar way, an earthquake is of
significant duration in terms of the succession of its manifestations, but it is
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no more than an instant of the geological history of the territory in which it
occurs.
Sometimes physics presupposes the existence of empirical things, or of
relationships, which have not yet been observed but presumably will be ob-
served to give coherence to the arrangement of other observations and of
their interpretations. We will call observable to an empirical reference than
can observed and presumable to that one than can only be presumed. The
interpretations of some of the observables became incompatible with the de-
velopment of empirical knowledge and for this reason had to be discarded.
As for the presumables, they are destined to be converted into observables or
else to be abandoned in accordance with the development of physical science
and of cultural awareness.
Among the observables that were discarded are found the rotation of the
sun around the earth and the constancy of the mass of a body. The planets
Neptune and Pluto were converted from presumable to observable, and the
phlogiston theory and the existence of ether were among those discarded.
The evolution of the knowledge of physics shows that the interpretation of
observables can never be considered as definitive but, in spite of this, in our
common cultural awareness remains the idea that the world is governed by
laws of nature that are definite, unchangeable and binding. We consider the
laws of nature as merely general and provisional, based on a definite number
of observations and interpretations, although sometimes this number is very
high.
“Belief in a natural necessity arises only when our concepts fit
so well to nature that they make their consequences conform with
the facts. But the assumption of this satisfactory adaptation of
our concepts can be invalidated at any moment by experience.”
(Mach)
We emphasize finally that the theories of physics are considered the more
in accordance with reality the more rationally simple their arrangement of
known observations and of their interpretations.
Time and memory
Throughout the development of mechanics, various qualitative definitions of
time have been proposed. We will take that of Leibniz who attributed to time
a relational empirical identity, considering that “instants without things are
nothing at all because they consist in the successive arrangement of things”,
and in line with this consideration he defined time as “the order of existence
of things that are not simultaneous”. We agree with this approach but we
find that the Leibniz definition leads to a vicious circle because “the order
of existence of things that are not simultaneous” derives from the temporal
order.
Newton found it unnecessary to define time because it is “a word that
everyone knows”, but he established the existence of two times: the first,
“absolute, true and mathematical” in which “in itself and of its own nature it
flows uniformly and with no relation to anything external, and is also termed
duration”; the second, “relative, evident and vulgar”, which is “a sensitive
and external (precise or unequal) measure of duration by movement”. We
find no empirical reference that would endorse these two classes of time,
and in addition we think that the action of flowing and its uniformity are
determined by time, which means that these terms lack empirical meaning
before defining time.
The great majority of our observations are compound in the sense that
they can be divided into parts – which are also observations – by using
the memory. If we continue to divide these parts, each physical exposition
becomes a series of minimal significant observations, each one is temporarily
equivalent to any one of its parts. The duration of these elemental parts is
known as an instant.
Observations are recorded in our memory while they are occurring, so
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observing something and memorizing it are the two sides of the same mental
operation. From this operative dualism of our mind we are able to attribute
an empirical identity to the temporal order before/after : when we can recall
an instantaneous observation while making another, we consider the first to
come before the second, and when we cannot tell whether one or other came
first we consider them to be simultaneous, which means that we are giving
an empirical characterization to the temporal order by means of the memory.
This characterisation of the temporal order could appear to be merely a
recognition of the obvious fact that before remembering something we must
have observed it, but this triviality either lacks empirical meaning when the
term before also lacks it, or it becomes a redundance if the term before does
have empirical meaning.
A compound observation has two extreme instantaneous parts: the be-
ginning is the instantaneous part before all the others and the end is the
instantaneous part after all the others. The temporal order between com-
pound observations is established from that of their extremes; in particular,
two compound observations are simultaneous when their extremes are simul-
taneous.
We can now give an empirical definition to physical time, which is a spe-
cific magnitude represented by the mathematical variable t in the equations
and formulae of physics. The amounts of this magnitude are the durations
of events, so in defining the durations we will have defined time. Accord-
ingly we will try to make the empirical definitions as simple as is reasonably
possible.
“Time must be defined in such a way that the equations of
mechanics are the simplest possible.” (Poincare´).
It is an observable fact that if two instantaneous events, located in the
same place, provoke two simultaneous observations in an observer, they do
provoke also two simultaneous observations in all the observers; therefore the
simultaneousness of instant events, located together, is an objective empirical
reference. For example, if two cars collide the arrivals of the two at the place
of the collision are two objectively simultaneous events.
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A compound event can be said to be at rest when all its instantaneous
parts occur in the same place. The duration of an event at rest is the empirical
characteristic it shares with all the events at rest located in the same place
and and that are simultaneous with it. This definition is very limited as it
excludes events in movement or which do not coincide in the same place, and
these are the most numerous.
To define the duration of events in all possible cases, we use as a base
the composite events known as periodical. A periodical event consists of a
succession of consecutive parts that our memory assumes as equal. Periodical
events may be due to natural or to artificial phenomena, the latter provoked
by instruments we call clocks.
As the periods of a single clock are not simultaneous, the equality of
its durations cannot be confirmed. But we can observe that the relation-
ship between the numbers of periods of different clocks in the same place
remains noticeably constant, no matter how many periods are considered.
The simplest interpretation of this observable constancy is to consider that
the durations of the periods are equal in each of the clocks.
The frequency of a clock is the inverse of the duration of its period. The
lag between two clocks of the same frequency is equal, by definition, to the
duration of the interval between the end of the period of one of them and
the beginning of the following period of the other. When the lag between
two clocks shows no variation, they are said to be synchronized.
Let us consider that the duration of an event at rest is equal to the dura-
tion of a simultaneous interval of a clock located next to it. The duration of
the interval is equal to the number of clock periods contained in it, multiplied
by the duration of the period. If the duration of a clock period is taken as
unity, it is possible to measure the durations of all the events at rest.
The quotient between the duration of any interval of time and the increase
in the time-lag between two equal clocks – originated in such interval – can be
confirmed to be perceptibly constant; this quotient is equal to the number of
periods that have to pass until the time-lag between the two clocks increases
by one period. The inverse value of this quotient is known as the regularity
of the two clocks; the regularity of a group of clocks is equal to the lowest
regularity in two of them.
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Placing a clock at each point of a physical space, we can define the du-
rations of all the events occurring at this point. The set of these durations
form a magnitude known as the punctual time in the space in question. The
maximum simplicity of the mechanics is reached by assigning a single time
to each space, which is known as the local time of that space. A definition
of the local time implies an attribution of a physical meaning to the instant
now, when it refers to different places. We will consider that when the clocks
of the same space are synchronized, now is by definition the indication of
any one of them. This is equivalent to giving physical identity to the syn-
chronisation of separate clocks, and for this it is necessary to give physical
meaning to the simultaneousness of two instant events that do not occur at
the same point of a physical space.
While the speed of light was considered infinite, the indications of all the
clocks were assumed to be seen simultaneously, so to synchronize them was an
immediate operation. When it was found that light had a finite speed, it was
thought sufficient to assign to the clocks the time-lags that were equal to the
durations of the time it took the light to pass from them to the observers.
This became part of our cultural awareness and lasted until the theory of
relativity.
Many physicists entertain the possibility of giving a qualitative defini-
tion of physical time from the second law of thermodynamics, making the
before/after relation that of the amount of the lesser/greater entropy of an
isolated physical system. But it is not possible to define time quantitatively
in this way, because the variation of the entropy is not periodical but increases
monotonically.
In view of the above, we make the final point which is that clocks do
not only measure the duration of events but they also characterize them
physically.
Space and sight
“It may be that in the future we may have other ideas, at
present beyond our reach, about the nature of space. Until then
we will have to consider geometry as being at the level of me-
chanics, which is empirical.” (Gauss).
The straightness of a line, the length of a segment and the distance be-
tween two points are for us the three basic observables from which we char-
acterize space. We consider that the empirical identity of each of the three
derives from the one that preceded it in the order given above, so we begin by
attributing empirical identity to straightness, which is equivalent to giving a
qualitative definition of the straight line.
The primary component of physical geometry is the point, an elementary
observable geometrically equivalent to any of its parts. A point is said to be
simple when it does not coincide with any other; simple lines contain only
simple points. Compound lines, however, contain points that are not simple,
but as these can be decomposed into simple lines, we will refer only to lines
and points that are simple. We will also assume that all lines are material
and rigid.
Lines are either straight or curved. Curved lines are those that are not
straight, so a qualitative definition of straight lines defines the curved lines
by exclusion.
Throughout the history of geometry, the straight line has been given
different empirical qualitative definitions, of which the Euclidean is one the
first usually quoted: “the straight line is that which rests equally on its
points”. The rest of a line now seems an empirical reference of uncertain
significance, since we are separated from the language of Euclid by twenty-
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three centuries.
Hero of Alexandria defined the straight line as “the line that remains
immobile when its ends are kept fixed”. Other definitions (by Leibniz, Gauss
and Poincare´) also refer to a mechanical axis, or are based in some way on
movement or repose. For Lobachevsky, the straight line is “the line that
coincides with itself in all its positions”. From our point of view, all these
definitions of the straight line include what they define in the definition,
since the physical characterisation of movement is based on the measurement
of distances and all distances are measured with units that are (straight)
segments.
The same objection can be made to the commonest definition of the
straight line as ‘the shortest distance between two points’. Proclus defined
the straight line as “a tensed line between two fixed points”, but this amounts
to the same: in order to tense a material line physically between two fixed
points its length has to be reduced to a minimum.
Another definition of the straight line is based on its being the only line
that is determined from two of its points. However this is only a property
that gives no indication of how the remaining points are determined from
these two.
“We usually consider that three points belong to a straight
line when, with a correct disposition of the visual standpoint, the
line of sight common to two of them passes through the third.”
(Einstein)
We take this remark of Einstein as the basis of our definition of empirical
straightness. Which observation allows us to prove that a ruler, a rod, a
tensed cord or indeed any material line is straight? We answer the question
describing what to we do: place each line so that we see the two extremes su-
perimposed and then look to see whether in this position all the other points
are also superimposed on these two. So we will consider a line as straight
when we see it as though it were a single point, or in other words when all its
points hide together behind either of its ends. This visual characterization
of straightness is shown explicitly in astronomy, geodesy and topography, in
which straight lines are essentially visual. In shorter distances, straight lines
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can consist of tensed cords or of rigid poles, but in these cases we assume that
they all represent materialized lines of sight. The visual nature of straight-
ness was stated implicitly by Plato when he referred to it as “the line whose
centre eclipses both its ends”.
Light is reflected and is fractured when it passes through the separation
surfaces of different transparent media, curving in optical media that are
inhomogeneous, partly surrounding opaque obstacles and dividing into dif-
ferent paths when it propagates in some transparent media. This variable
propagation of light is due to the action of the matter, so straight lines co-
incide exactly with the paths of light only in a vacuum (or, perceptibly, in
the air around us). Therefore the statement that light travels in a straight
line under a vacuum does not state a property of light but it expresses the
redundance of a propagation of light under vacuum along its own path.
It is not possible to compare the straightness of some segments with others
because they are all perceptibly equal, which means that straightness is not
a magnitude. For comparison of the segments we will use their length, the
other empirical characteristic that they have in common.
When all the points of two material segments at rest can be placed in
contact simultaneously, these two can be defined as congruent. We will define
qualitatively the length of a segment at rest as the empirical characteristic it
shares with all the segments that are congruent with it, and only with these.
As for the distance between two points at rest, we define it as the length of
a segment whose ends coincide simultaneously with these two points. Since
we have characterized straightness in terms of sight, as a result the length
and the distance are also characterized by this sense.
The length of curved lines at rest cannot be defined qualitatively from the
congruence between them since a congruence of curved lines is exceptional:
no arc is totally nor partially congruent with all the arcs of all the curved
lines. For a qualitative definition of the length of an arc of a curved line at
rest, a series of polygonal lines with an increasing number of sides must be
inscribed in it. It can be shown empirically that the length of these polygonal
lines increases with the growing number of sides, until finally, from one of the
polygonal lines on, no increase is perceived. This empirical reference allows
the length of an arc of a curved line to be defined as the length of any one
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of the successive polygonal lines. The outcome of this is that the lengths of
curved lines at rest consist in lengths of straight lines, which means that the
empirical definition of straightness must come before that of length.
We are convinced that when a line moves, it remains equal to itself, for
the simple fact of moving. But this conviction has no empirical foundation
other than the fact that the line is equal to itself before and after moving.
How can a line be defined qualitatively while it is moving?
Physically, a moving line consists empirically, at each instant, in a line
at rest which is congruent with itself at that instant, which means that all
the points of the two coincide simultaneously. A moving line is therefore a
sequence of successive congruent lines at rest, which leave ‘fixed traces’ in
the space through which they move. From this definition it follows that the
length of a moving line differs in general at each instant of its movement.
We will identify empirically physical bodies (or simply bodies) as visi-
ble material objects that resist being penetrated or deformed, which means
that we are characterising physical bodies by means of the visual or tactile
sensations they cause on us. The material points of a body are their least
physically significant parts.
A geometrical point is place so small that it can be filled entirely by
a material point. The large areas of a physical space are a collection of
geometrical points in contact with one another, that can be filled by bodies
with more than one material point.
“Any spatial localization of the place of an object or of an
event is reduced to giving the point of a rigid body of reference
that coincides with that object.” (Einstein)
To characterize physical space, we assume that a body extends virtually,
without limits, throughout the whole empirical exterior scenario. This un-
limited virtual prolongation of the body, similar to a ‘rigid vacuum’ linked to
it, is an empirical representation of the physical space referred to that body.
The empirical identity of the geometrical points is determined by rigid
surfaces, lines or angles of reference, which form a system of coordinates ; the
terms ‘space’ and ‘systems of coordinates’ are often used without distinc-
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tion. When the systems move at constant velocities among them, they are
described as ‘inertial’.
We tend to interpret that we see objects in the place they occupy at the
moment we see them, but this is true only when they are at rest. When
they are moving, as is more frequent, the shape and the location of the
objects depends on the place from which they are observed, and they are
never where we see them because the speed of light is not infinite. So the
general geometrical configuration of the empirical exterior scenario is not an
observable unique and absolute, but plural and relative.
Among all the virtual geometrical transformations of bodies and spaces,
we consider as most important the symmetry of a space A respect to a plane,
with which another symmetrical space A′ is formed, with a sense of turn in
rotations and a distinction of left from right that are contrary to those of A.
An example of the consequences of this symmetry is found in a famous
story. When Alice goes through the looking-glass, she does it as though
she were passing from space A to space A′ through a window, keeping her
corporal integrity and hence her geometrical references of space A. So Alice
notices for this reason that beyond the mirror the clocks C ′ go in the opposite
direction to clocks C and that the difference between right and left is also
the opposite, except in her own body. But if she had passed symmetrically
through the mirror, decomposing and recomposing her body point by point,
her new body would have been symmetrical to the former one and she would
have found no change in the geometrical references in space A′ since they
would then have had the same relation to her body.
Then there is the example of two observers living in different realities
but able to communicate with each other. These observers would not be
able to interchange any information that would allow them to know whether
or not they lived in symmetrical spatial realities. It is true that modern
physics quotes phenomena that are always manifest objectively as either left
or right, but this empirical reference is related to our reality which we suppose
applicable to all possible worlds. However this assumption has no empirical
sense as it cannot be proved.
Movement
We say that a body moves in the given physical space when there is a change
in the places occupied by its material points. So the movement of a body is
a relative characteristic, referred to the space in which it moves.
From different spaces the movement of a body can be interpreted in dif-
ferent ways, all of them consistent with observation, even though some of
them are hardly compatible with already elaborated physical knowledge and
for this reason must be rejected. When walking, I think it obvious that I
move in relation to the ground, and not the ground that moves in relation to
me. Again, if a stone falls, I find it obvious that it is the stone that comes
down to hit the ground, and not the ground that rises to hit the stone. In
both these cases I take it for granted that the movements I consider obvious
are the real ones.
Cinematic evidence can vary with time, thus changing a movement con-
sidered as real. For centuries it was thought that the earth remained at rest
in the centre of the universe while the sun moved round it in an annual pe-
riodic course (geocentric system). In addition, the firmament was thought
to be a dome that turned daily around the earth. Later it was found more
consistent to assume that all the planets, including the earth, moved round
the sun (heliocentric system) while turning on their axes.
The heliocentric system, in stating that the earth was not a privileged
planet in the centre of divine creation, questioned ecclesiastical authority.
The Catholic hierarchy of the time rejected it, a rejection that was not con-
trary to observation since Galileo could not prove with his telescope that the
heliocentric system expressed the real movement of the earth. Nobody can
prove it since no movement has a way of being that can be considered its real
way of being. The heliocentric system was only a consistent interpretation
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simpler than the geocentric.
As for the daily turn of the heavenly vault, it became incompatible with
the development of classical mechanics, whereas the turn of the earth around
its axis is compatible, besides simpler, and no other interpretation can be
conceived today.
After Galileo, Newton based classical mechanics on very simple laws that
provided a simple interpretation of dynamic phenomena. For that reason our
cultural awareness has made Newton something of a myth, a brilliant vision-
ary who discovered the natural laws that govern mechanical phenomena.
As we mentioned already, we consider the natural laws – and among them
the laws of physics – to be no more than general rules or postulates although
we will keep calling them laws, as it is customary. We see the genius of
Newton in the sphere of mechanics as the systematization he achieved of
all the accepted concepts, specifying three general postulates from which
observable dynamic phenomena can be deduced, and a fourth postulate that
defines and quantifies the forces of remote attraction between material bodies.
Note that Newton characterized forces not as physically observables but
as presumables to be defined according to their observable effects (the accel-
erations and deformations of a body). The fact that forces are not observ-
able was a disappointment for many physicists, and some of them developed
mechanical systems that omitted them. Kirchhoff and Hertz elaborated me-
chanical systems made up of differential equations without reference to forces.
But the mechanics that don’t mention forces are less intuitive and mathemat-
ically more complicated, so ordinary mechanical expositions keep mentioning
forces.
Newton’s fourth postulate was the law of universal gravitation. The ex-
istence of forces of attraction between material bodies separated by a dis-
tance, under vacuum, has been an empirical question highly disputed from
the beginning. Newton himself wrote “the fact that gravity might be innate,
inherent and essential to matter, so that one body would act on another at
a distance, across vacuum and with no other interference, is so absurd to
me that I can imagine no one capable of thinking in terms of philosophy
who would accept it”. This fourth postulate has now been surpassed by the
theory of general relativity as is reported here below.
Modern mechanics
“Many physicists find it unthinkable that the most remote
experience can ever change any of the unshakeable principles of
mechanics. And yet what comes from experience can always be
rectified by experience.” (Poincare´)
At the end of the XIX century most physicists shared the conviction
that mechanics was founded definitively on the objective laws that regulate
mechanical phenomena. But the interpretation of the constant of the speed
of light and the behaviour of sub-atomic particles brought new theories of
mechanics that caused a revolution in the characterization of reality: the
theory of relativity and quantum mechanics.
The theory of relativity are two theories: the special and the general,
both successively formulated by Einstein. The special theory mainly deals
with the relativity of distances and of durations (i.e., of space and of time)
in inertial reference systems. And the general theory extends this relativity
to any system and interprets gravity in terms of the structure of space.
At the end of the XIX century Maxwell had predicted theoretically that
light is an electromagnetic radiation whose velocity, c, is the same in all in-
ertial systems, and Michelson confirmed experimentally the certainty of this
prediction. Einstein raised the constancy of the speed of light in vacuum to
the category of law of physics and revised mechanics from this standpoint,
which led him to some surprising theoretical conclusions: the relative char-
acter of distances and durations, the impossibility that anything could move
faster than light, the slowing of clocks in motion, the shortening of bodies
in the direction of their movement, the increase of the mass of a body with
speed, the equivalence between energy and mass, the precession of the or-
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bits of the planets and so on. All these conclusions have been confirmed in
practice.
To expound his findings in order, Einstein began by a physical definition
of the simultaneousness of two instantaneous events occurring in different
places, for which he set up a method of synchronizing two separate watches.
“A definition of simultaneousness is required that by its own
nature provides the method of decision in given cases.”
(Einstein)
He imagined two separate observers, O and O′, beside the two clocks, C
and C ′. If observer O sends a luminous signal to observer O′ at an instant
(t of his clock C) and O′ returns this signal to O at the instant of its reception
(t′ of his clock C ′) then O, on receiving the return signal (at the instant
t + ∆t of C), considers that clock C ′ did show the instant t′ = t + ∆t
2
when O′ returned the signal. If observer O transmits this information to O′,
the latter can synchronize his clock with that of O. This would mean that
simultaneousness is a physical characteristic of each of the physical spaces,
which is founded on the constant of the speed of light.
If all the clocks in a physical space are assumed to be synchronized in this
way, the punctual time indicated by any one of them is, by definition, the local
time of that space. So two separate instantaneous events are simultaneous
when they occur at the same instant of the local time of the space in which
they are placed.
If the distance between two points is characterized as the length of a
segment whose ends coincide simultaneously in these two points, and the
duration of an event as the difference between the indications of a clock
that are simultaneous with the ends of the event, then physical distances
and durations can be defined empirically considering a constant the speed of
light in vacuum. Therefore speed of light in vacuum is measured by means
of itself, so its constancy can be interpreted as a redundance rather than as
a natural law.
The transformation of the three coordinates of space and time, from an
inertial system S to another S ′, provided that c remains constant in the
transformation, shows that each of the new coordinates in S ′ depend on c
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and on the coordinates in S, so the constancy of c implies that physical space
and time are relative and interdependent. One possible interpretation of this
proposes the existence of an absolute space-time continuum of four dimen-
sions: the three traditional spatial dimensions (x, y, z) and time (t) which
would be a fourth. This continuum generalises the mathematical treatment
of the relativistic theories and allows the establishment of physical invariants
that are maintained in a change of physical space.
In the general theory of relativity, Einstein defined gravity empirically by
the intrinsic curvature of the space-time continuum, following the innovative
geometric ideas of Riemann. This definition rejected the existence of distant
forces, interpreting gravitational attraction as an effect of the curvature of
the continuum space-time originated by material bodies. This new theory of
gravity provided an understanding of the physical nature of the universe in
terms of coherent geometrical structures and therefore a consequent handling
of very intense gravitational fields.
The theory of relativity overcame the contradictions that had arisen in
classical mechanics at the end of the XIX century, with a new characterization
of space, time and gravity, so it can be considered an innovative culmination
of classical mechanics from within.
“The theory of relativity has taught us that space and time
and also the form and motion of materials in space and time are
hypothetical mental constructions, by no means unquestionable.”
(Schro¨dinger)
While relativity surpassed the interpretations and postulates of classical
mechanics (confirming the open and transitory nature of physical knowl-
edge), an even more radical revolution was to occur in the physics of the
XX century. To interpret the physical phenomena that exist on a scale be-
yond observation, and their manifestations on a scale that can be observed,
a new mechanics was developed. Known as quantum mechanics, the new
system abandoned determinism to interpret reality in probabilistic terms. It
attributed a discrete nature to energy, assuming it to be composed of quanta,
or indivisible elements.
Modern mechanics 35
Quantum mechanics states the existence of a discrete lower limit of energy
transport from the particles of a process to any instrument of measurement,
thus giving statistical character to the observation of the process. The situ-
ation of a particle is determined by an associated wave probability function,
so the particle can be at any point at which this function is not null.
“The state of a system in quantum mechanics may be charac-
terized by a vector in a multidimensional space, and this vector
implies statements about the statistical behaviour of the system
in certain conditions of observation. The objective description
of the system, in the traditional sense, is impossible, but if ex-
periments are repeated many times we are finally able to deduce
statistical distributions from the observations, and if the series of
experiments is repeated we can reach objective judgements about
these distributions.” (Heisenberg)
These words of Heisenberg show the great qualitative change operated
in classical mechanics by quantum mechanics, the greatest change being
the substitution of causal necessity by causal probability, i.e. determinis-
tic physics by random physics.
The definitions and postulates of quantum mechanics, with the radically
new interpretation of reality, surpass classical mechanics from the outside.
It should be noted that the birth and development of quantum mechanics
gave rise to great controversy among the physicists of the period and to
considerable opposition.
“God does not play dice.” (Einstein)
“It is not for us to tell God how He should govern the world.”
(Bohr)
The example of quantum mechanics led to the development of new theo-
ries of physics, coherent and mathematically complicated, that offer abstract
definitions of their components and their postulates. To give an empirical
interpretation of these theories is often difficult or even impossible so we will
not go into them here.
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“The theories of superchords and supersymmetries are cer-
tainly very fine but we have no experimental proof of them and
I do not know what they mean.”
(Veltman, Nobel prizewinner of physics, 1999)
Final considerations
The substantial changes that have come about in physics throughout its
development are a demonstration of the open nature of this science. Bertrand
Russell clearly expressed the succession of these changes : “For Newton, space
and time were solid and independent; now they are replaced by space-time,
which is not substantial but a system of relationships. Matter has had to be
replaced by series of events. Force has been replaced by energy. And energy
has turned out to be indistinguishable from the pale ghost that remains of
matter.”
With the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics, have we reached
the description of a part of physical reality such as it is? Will these theories
come to be definitely incorporated into physics as this continues its devel-
opment? Our radically empirical standpoint leads us to answer no to these
two questions because, on one hand, physical reality has no independent and
definitive ways of being that we discover bit by bit, and on the other, physical
knowledge is transient and changeable, like the cultural awareness that de-
velops it and is developed by it. Much of what is observed may be definitive,
but this is not true of its interpretations, so to characterize physical reality
is an endlessly task. It is like trying to catch our own shadow.
One of the most firmly-held beliefs in our cultural awareness is the convic-
tion that the nature of physical reality is always the same in whatever time
or place (in this or in another possible world). But this has no empirical
meaning as we cannot observe any other different from ours (if such exists),
nor can we observe how our future reality will be.
This raises the particularly important question as to whether physics is
an essentially unique series of theories becoming simpler and wider, or is it
an open series of consistent theories that have been interpreting – in the form
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of logical deductive systems – the physical observables known at each time.
We think that nothing necessarily leads physics to continue as it has been
throughout its historical development, which means that present-day physics
could be qualitatively different from what it is.
In addition, we think that the cause/effect relationship is no more than a
useful rule that simplifies the deductive ordering of empirical references. But
the certainty of this relationship cannot be based on experience, even though
we have seen this always fulfilled, we cannot see that it may not be fulfilled
at some time. Causal necessity has no empirical meaning; causal probability
does have this meaning, even though this probability is usually high enough
to be equivalent to a necessity.
“We have often experienced the fall of a stone to the ground
but we have never experienced that it will always fall.” (Hume)
The question ‘What is physics?’ leads to the more general question ‘What
is anything? ’ What empirical meaning is there in asking what something is,
or more simply what is what is? From our point of view, this question is the
same as asking what we can expect from something, and in particular how
we should react in its presence. We understand, then, that the being that
we attribute to any empirical item is a set of data for our use. In computer
terminology we can say that all the information that enters the human brain
is programmed.
We regard reason as our most valuable and most characteristic attribute
with two different interrelated components: a biological hardware (the neuro-
logical network of the brain) and a mental software (the programs recorded in
our mind by our instinct, personal experience and cultural awareness). The
two components have been developed together, interrelated and modelled by
genetic mutations and by changes in the empirical circumstances we had to
face. This portrayal of reasoning allows us to conjecture the existence of a
formal link between the abstract structure of logic and the material structure
of the brain.
And so we understand that reason is not a single independent human
feature, bestowed on us by nature, but a developed faculty which could well
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be otherwise, in different ways beyond the understanding of our cultural
awareness. In empirical terms we should speak not of reason but of reasons.
And finally we mention a consequence of the interactive development of
reason and the characterization of reality. Taking into account the funda-
mental, simplifying and effective role of reason in the empirical interpretation
of our world, we can consider that the most real at each moment is the most
rational then, and vice versa.
